Archive for May, 2007

Global Migration in Global Society

May 17, 2007

Niklaus Steiner
Director, Center for Global Initiatives
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Email: nsteiner@unc.edu

In considering the emerging field of Global Studies, an important question appears to be: what is the unit of analysis? It seems to me the answer lies somewhere in the holistic concept of “global society” – that collectivity of 6+ billion individuals and their interactions. Instead of trying to flesh out a definition, let me instead offer some thoughts on one aspect of the interaction of this collectivity in hopes of sharpening the concept.

While the global movement of products, services, ideas, and information is increasingly free, the movement of people across borders remains tightly controlled. This control over migration is highly controversial because it is the result of two forces colliding: never before have so many people had the ability to move from one country to another while at the same time states have never had so much power to control such movement. This simultaneity leads to numerous controversies, and I’ll focus on two: migration links immigration to refugee protection, and it raises questions about national identity.

Both immigrants and refugees are “international migrants” (i.e. people who cross international borders), but immigrants are largely admitted on the basis of national self-interest; the post-war guest worker programs in Northern Europe are good examples of this approach. Refugees, however, arouse a sense of moral responsibility and the treatment of them is guided by an elaborate set of international laws and norms. Refugees are defined by the 1951 UN Convention as individuals who face a well-founded fear of persecution at the hands of their government because of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group. Important to note is that economic hardship is not a criterion for being recognized as a refugee. Some advocates, however, argue that a moral obligation exists to accept poor people, especially those whose poverty stems from internal governmental actions or neglect, or when external governmental or corporate policies are implicated. Such advocates question why nations should privilege a migrant facing death due to persecution over one facing death due to poverty. Opposing arguments assert that, while poverty may raise moral questions, all poor people from all over the world cannot practically be granted refugee status. Where to draw the line between these two positions stirs the pot.

The global movement of immigrants and refugees raises the question of citizenship and national identity. Liberal democracies want the people to rule and this wish is declared in such documents as the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution (“We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union…”) and the Declaration of Independence (“When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bonds…”). These documents express the essence of a democracy, a term derived from the Greek words demos meaning “people” and kratos meaning “rule.” This concept is deceptively simple because letting “the people rule” is by no means a straightforward proposition as it forces the citizens of the country to define the people. Who is going to be included in the demos that is ruling? And by making this decision of inclusion, a decision of exclusion is automatically made: who is not part of the people and why not? Far from being merely abstract questions, they are at the very heart of how we citizens treat foreigners amongst us.

Like most liberal democracies, the United States has a naturalization process for foreigners to become citizens, and I myself went through it by answering such questions as “In what city and in what year was the Declaration of Independence signed?” and “What are the three branches of government?” I also passed a reading and writing test that was absurdly easy for me, but probably quite challenging for others in the room. It made me wonder what kind of test is reasonable to demonstrate that one is now “American.” Perhaps it should also be important to demonstrate knowledge about pop culture (what is YouTube?) or current events (what state was recently badly hit by tornados?). Such questions, though, would surely trip up many citizens and would that somehow make them less American? Maybe there should be different kinds of tests for different kinds of foreigners, or no test at all and just grant citizenship automatically after a set amount of time (5 years? 10 years?).

To add to the complexity is the fact that citizenship is both a legal status and a form of identity. As a legal status, citizenship provides an individual various rights and duties vis-à-vis the state, and as a matter of identity, citizenship grants an individual the sense of belonging to a larger community. It is noteworthy that there is not always a perfect overlap between the two. For example, an American may enjoy the legal status of being a citizen (i.e. votes and pays taxes) but does not feel like an American (perhaps she spent much time abroad or rejects the values that she sees Americans embracing). The reverse is also possible: a foreigner who does not seek or enjoy legal citizenship but who embraces what he considers to be Americana. The ongoing controversy in Europe over Muslims wearing headscarves in public places is a good example of the difference between legal and identity citizenship: they may be French citizens in one way but not in another.

In the face of global migration, it is therefore difficult to set public policy about who to admit and how to make them part of us. The vast field of policy options between the extremes of “Kick them all out” and “Kumbaya…We are the World” is strewn with monetary and moral questions with which we citizens must grapple. Given other pressing needs, how much money should we spend on border patrol? Should we prefer some foreigners over others? How much power should we grant the government to check for proper documentation? In seeking answers, the debate quickly becomes heated because it touches upon core values regarding civil liberties, human rights and the limited role of government. Setting a migration policy forces us citizens to weigh not only how the policy would affect foreigners but also how it would affect us. For on this issue, there is no clear distinction between us and them. That is a function of global society.

global-e volume 1 number 1 may 2007

global-e, A Global Studies Electronic Journal: Précis

May 15, 2007
Sponsors of global-e

Increasing connections and interdependencies among institutions and peoples around the world direct our attention to globalization as a central phenomenon of the contemporary era. From economy to culture to environment, the great issues of our time require close attention to the dynamic interactions among actors and stakeholders around the world. It is commonly observed that all societies are now part of a global system that is stitched together by far-reaching trade protocols, governance covenants, and communication networks. Although this process of integration engenders dramatic new opportunities for cooperation and development, it is also characterized by profound inequities and uncertainties that breed dramatic new tensions and conflicts. Globalization is furthermore distinguished by challenges to previous loyalties and affinities, as questions of belonging and citizenship assume new meanings in an era of accelerating flows of people, goods, and capital across national frontiers.

Published on a quarterly basis, Global-e aims to provide a forum for commentary regarding global events, processes, and issues. Each edition will feature brief essays authored by leading scholars and practitioners, offering provocative reflections on a range of topics with the aim of stimulating discussion among the global studies community. As each new edition is posted on the web, email announcements will be delivered to individual subscribers and to listserves associated with professional and scholarly organizations interested in global studies. We aim both to encourage circulation of commentary essays and to stimulate discussion among readers. Accordingly, each essay will be open to reader response and deliberation.

Global-e will focus initially on building relations among global studies programs. Commentaries will focus on public issues, theoretical debates, methodological challenges, and curricular concerns. Authored by scholars and practitioners, the Global-e editorial staff will solicit essays of approximately 1000-1200 words, which is the standard length for opinion pieces in most newspapers, magazines, and journals. Our aim is to provoke discussion and to provide commentators the opportunity to circulate their ideas in a new format. The journal is managed by a consortium of global studies programs at the Universities of Illinois, North Carolina, Wisconsin-Madison, and Wisconsin-Milwaukee.

global-e volume 1 number 1 may 2007

The Intellectual Foundations of Global Studies

May 15, 2007

David Jacobson
Professor of Global Studies
Arizona State University
Email: dshjacobson@gmail.com

Ning Wang
Assistant Professor of Global Studies
Arizona State University
Email: ningwang@asu.edu

The field of Global Studies is growing in institutional terms rather rapidly. Yet beyond an interest in interdisciplinarity, and a desire to go beyond the parameters of traditional international relations, the intellectual core, parameters or central problematique of the field has not been very well defined. In one sense, this is a significant opportunity. Apropos to the spirit of Kuhn, much of the study of international relations (IR), and the social sciences in general, has fallen into often insular disciplinary debates. The “important” questions, and the tools to address those questions, are largely predetermined and deeply institutionalized. Yet it is not enough as a response to simply call for interdisciplinary work, but to define what that in a fundamental intellectual sense means, and what opportunities it provides analytically and, potentially, in policy terms. Global Studies is itself an opportunity as it allows us to think de novo-a primordial moment, as it were-unbound by disciplinary intellectual and institutional constraints. This is not simply an academic issue: the pressing global challenges-from the environmental to cultural conflict-demand much better analytical tools and, where possible, more effective policy.

Microeconomics had a fundamental impact on the study of international relations, through IR realism (and its focus on unitary agents and the ensuing international structural effects), and this in turn has framed the responses as well. So much so, we would suggest, that subsequent critiques have maintained the structural pivot from liberalism to constructivism to even poststructuralism. But in so doing, the field of international relations has (as have other social science fields) imported much of the limitations of mainline economics as well, limitations highlighted by the work of the Nobel Laureate in Economics Ronald Coase. For Coase, the study of economics concerns the substantive workings of the economic system, as opposed to the formal view where economics is, in essence, a set of versatile tools, detachable from the subject matter they apply to. Coase argued that the method should be defined by the substantive issue in question rather than the method defining the problem. Coase asks, “Do we concern ourselves not with the puzzles presented by the real economic world but with the puzzles presented by other economists’ analysis?” By extension, that question can be applied to just about any social science.

Crucial is the optic we apply to our study. The smoke and fire of internal disciplinary debates, such as that between neorealists and IR constructivists, hides the essentially shared optic of those trajectories of thought. In a curious way, the early driver of the social sciences to be applicable to state and policy made it so ineffective for analysis-or policy. The stress on uniform first principles of human behavior, standardization, parsimony, simplification, universality and on “norms” and “means” led to blueprints for organizing forests to designing cities to agriculture to polities. Except in certain culturally appropriate conditions, this involved top-down planning and massive dislocation and suffering-notably, in the communist and fascist upheavals of the 20th century (so vividly described in James Scott’s work). We social scientists have retained the tools and the optics, if not the ambitions or morals, of this foundation of the social sciences.

The problem is that optic is flawed analytically and for policy. Through first principles, uniform assumptions and abstracting and averaging human behavior, social science creates a method to simplify understanding of society. With a mighty hammer in hand, as the saying goes, we turn every problem into a nail. Ernst Mayr gets to the core of the problem when he notes, that of the some six billion individuals in the world no two individuals are the same, even identical twins: “It is this variation among the uniquely different individuals that has reality, while the statistical mean variation is an abstraction.”

The structural pivot of the social sciences, alluded to earlier, is critical to our collective astigmatism. Structures can be broken down to constituent parts. The parts are inorganic, and thus universal in their import. In the social sciences the constituent parts are variables. By pulling our variable of universal import-democracy, income, etc.-human entities can be broken down into constituent parts, but the scientific interest is in determining relationships. The assumption of universality and causal ties is endemic and impacts other methodologies as well. This needs little illustration in the assumptions and calculations of variants of realist theory, liberal institutionalist approaches, or in the democratic peace arguments.

The structural hammer extends to policy. Societies are “built,” constitutions are proffered, uniform “best practices” are promoted-and have a long history of failure. Nations and their borders were created de novo in colonial Africa and we are still living with the consequences, politically as well as economically. After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, structural recipes were put forward (notably by Jeffrey Sachs) to transform centralized economies to free market economies. It was proposed that with the right structural changes-stock markets, private property, currency exchange, a legal system to match, etc.-the spirit of capitalism would flourish, regardless of the setting. But the results have been mixed and the approach was in effect ad hoc and indifferent to local cultural and social institutions.

Instead we suggest an optic that we refer to as “organic thinking.” We comprehend our subject matter-in this case global and local relations-endogenously; where method is determined by the subject matter rather than the other way around; and to consider the concatenations of social and political relations in their own terms. Methodologically, this demands the careful study of the evolution of social forms on different scales, and the process whereby the form changed through contingency or adaptation; to study it as an “interactive” organism; to use a direct approach of study, focusing on the particular and the local (not assuming, for example, first principles as to human motivation); and delineating institutions on their own terms.

Organic thinking also does not presume, a priori, a structural kind of reductionism, by which complex structures and processes are broken down into component parts and then, as Stephen Jay Gould notes, seek to explain the complexity as a function of properties and laws regulating the parts. Nor are institutions necessarily presumed to be additive or linear, as opposed to non-linear (where the larger order cannot be deduced from considering the components separately). Reductionists claim that, if we understand the components sufficiently, we can still predict this form additively in a basically deterministic world. This is not to preclude one method or approach, but to use them as a function of the subject matter, not vice-versa. Gould notes, where molecular physics explains simple compounds, the physiology of individual neurons may not generate an adequate theory of memory. We must dispense with a one-size fits all approach.

Against the mechanical and overly deterministic thinking embodied in the structural approach, organic thinking stresses the individuality of actors and institutions-their identity, relationships, and so on. Issues of trust and mistrust, for example, become central. Consider, for example, the finding of Stephen Cornell that in Indian reservations where there was a strong “cultural match” between the social form that existed prior to federal control, and the constitutional form of governance established under the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, patterns of governance and economic development are relatively healthy. Where there is a mismatch, the results tend to be less salubrious. This illustrates the organic quality of society: in this case, the central importance of trust in (and legitimacy of) government.

We will tease out the practicalities of organic thinking, research and policy in a future article.

global-e volume 1 number 1 may 2007

The Nail House: Global Media, Local Politics

May 15, 2007

Michael Curtin
Director, Global Studies Program
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Email: mcurtin@wisc.edu

I’ve traveled to Asia many times over the past decade, and if everything works flawlessly, the trip takes about 24 hours door-to-door from my home in Madison to a hotel room on the other side of the world. Then it usually takes another 72 hours before my body begins to adjust to the rhythms of Asia. In the semi-hallucinogenic haze of jet lag, one becomes acutely aware that the titanic global struggle between corporate America and radical Islam figures little in the daily calculations of Chinese citizens who worry more about the dramatic changes taking place in their own backyards. Yet this doesn’t mean they’re globally disconnected. In fact, the opposite is true.

Most recently, their concerns were crystallized in television images of the stubborn nail house, a lonely brick structure sticking out of a vast pit dug around it by shopping mall developers in downtown Chongqing. Refusing to make way without a fight, Wu Ping vigorously waved a Chinese flag from the rooftop of his home, while his wife, Yang, regaled television reporters with vigorous criticism of the moneyed and politically-connected interests that threatened their home. The particulars of the case are perhaps less significant than the fact that the Wu family staged a self-conscious media war, receiving widespread TV coverage and more than 10 million Internet page views before government officials clamped the lid on it. An opinion poll conducted by one of China’s most popular websites, QQ.com, showed support for the Wus running four-to-one.

Depending on whom one listens to, China is either teetering on the brink of greatness or catastrophic demise. It is at once the most powerful economy in Asia and perhaps the most fragile, with some experts estimating that more than a hundred million of its citizens have taken to the road in search of work, while hundreds of thousands more have stayed at home to organize demonstrations for economic equity and social justice. Sit-ins, marches, and militant clashes with authorities are now regular occurrences, as government officials scramble to respond to the rising tide of protests.

Such a world is a long way from the end of history that Francis Fukuyama and others anticipated only a decade ago. At the time, it was suggested that the most momentous decisions after the Cold War would revolve around a set of rather mundane choices: Coke or Pepsi? Sony or Panasonic? MTV or ESPN? Media metaphors flowed easily then. Satellite TV and the dawning of the Worldwide Web seemed to augur a collapsing of boundaries and the ultimate triumph of consumer capitalism, leading to an era of global peace and prosperity. US leaders during the 1980s and 1990s contended that that trade liberalization, new technologies, and Western expertise (the Washington Consensus) would unleash the productive power of lesser-developed nations, a classic reassertion of the development paradigm that had fallen into disfavor during the 1970s. They likewise resurrected the end of ideology as the end of history, which played as a companion theme to the weightless economy and the global communication grid.

Of course the worm turns and now, in the new millennium, cultural and economic difference again seem as intractable as jet lag. Societies have grown wealthier, but disparities have grown greater. Global communication technologies have furthermore engendered disjunctive aspirations and imaginations on the part of media users. That is, rather than fostering spontaneous development, television exposure seems to be exacerbating tensions between global imagery and local experience. This media lag engenders much discomfort among the poor, but it also makes it possible for the Wus of Chongqing to lay claim to global standards of personal rights and governmental transparency, neither of which were available to them through local institutions. Television has created a space for Wus to imagine and perform their protest for appreciative audiences near and far, and to bring pressure to bear on powerful interests who aren’t accustomed to such scrutiny. Like global finance, world trade, and political liberalization, television is a powerful change agent in Asia.

The medium spread through the region at a remarkable pace during the 1990s, adding close to two billion new viewers. In China alone TV access has risen from virtually zero to some 90% of the population over the past twenty years. A medium that was originally intended to foster economic development and national unity has become a source of significant anxiety among leaders in Beijing, sparking debates over rising expectations and growing social activism. A similar trajectory of rapid adoption has taken place in India and the Middle East where policy makers also fret that the rapid diffusion of television exerts intense pressure to deliver the fruits of economic and social development quickly. Just as jet lag challenges one’s physical and mental capacities, so too is media diffusion challenging the institutional capacities of Asian societies. In this state of disjuncture, disparities of wealth seem to take on vivid significance in the lives of viewers. Rather than fostering aspirations for modernization and development (a desire to catch up), television makes uneven development fantastically apparent to TVs newest audiences.

Put another way, if one looks carefully at a map of the world’s proven oil reserves, it is glaringly obvious that resources in the Middle East eclipse the combined reserves of the rest of the world. Likewise, if one examines the geographic distribution of the world’s manufacturing workforce as a function of labor cost, one quickly is alerted to the significance of places like Guangdong province or Andra Pradesh. Now compare these global maps of resource distribution to maps of resource consumption, energy use, and per capita income. The disparities are stunning but nevertheless commonly pass without critical comment in the mainstream media. Yet even though television rarely acknowledges these disparities at an explicit level, it prismatically refracts them through the disjunctive delivery of fantasy images of consumption to the shantytowns and cramped quarters of the world’s working poor. Moreover, television’s fixation on female consumerism offers up relentless images of feminine agency that are commonly embraced by young women who leave behind the drudgery of familial servitude for a chance to migrate to the workshops of transnational capital. Social tensions therefore multiply beyond class issues to controversies over gender relations and family values, as well. Therefore, like jet lag, media lag intensifies one’s sensitivity to now and then, here and there, us and them.

It’s noteworthy therefore that the end of ideology coincided with the emergence of development communications during the 1950s and that the end of history accompanied the dawning of a global communication grid during the 1990s. Yet we have neither transcended ideology nor history. Instead, the globalization of electronic media and the resulting phenomenon of media lag is actually fostering ideological and historical awareness despite (or perhaps because of) television’s fixation on abundance and consumerism. It is therefore worth paying attention to the operations of both ideology and history as we reflect upon the recent increase in TV viewing around the world. For the social transformations that accompany new communication technologies often take time to register. In Asia, those transformations are perhaps just beginning.

global-e volume 1 number 1 may 2007

Interdisciplinary Prospects in Global Studies

May 15, 2007

Iva Bozovic
Ph.D. Student, Political Economy and Public Policy
University of Southern California, Department of Economics
Email: bozovic@usc.edu

For a scholar like myself, who in terms of traditional field demarcations would most likely be classified as a comparative political economist, the opportunities for a first-time tenure-track position can be found in more than one field. One can apply for attractive positions in a few economics departments, schools of public policy, schools of public and/or international affairs, and naturally, political science departments interested in scholars of international relations, comparative politics, political economy, or any combination of the three. The most appealing, however, are the programs in Global Studies. What sets these programs apart is their commitment to research and practice that transcend disciplines and their preferred methods of analysis. Moreover, they pledge to pursue a much needed comprehensive understanding of the increasingly interconnected world that we inhabit, as well as the challenges we must address as its global citizens.

The allure of a Global Studies program for a future professorial career lies in its promise to encourage and reward truly entrepreneurial and interdisciplinary scholarship. In line with Schumpeter’s conception of an entrepreneur as an innovator, Global Studies scholars are challenged to “carry out new combinations” in the crowded academic “markets” by introducing new research questions that demand alternative theories and new methods (or that employ existing tools in new directions) in order to offer alternative structures for the production of knowledge. According to Ronald Burt, such entrepreneurs are individuals who can broker across the structural holes that exist between bodies of ideas. While the ideas and opinions are likely to be homogeneous within groups, individuals who are connected to multiple groups across structural holes offer alternative and innovative points of view or, as Burt put it, “good ideas.” Global Studies programs, it seems, wish to capitalize on these ideas by bringing together scholars that are breaking away from the confines or loyalties of their respective disciplines, motivated solely by the thematic goals of understanding the needs and challenges of an integrated world society.

Global studies programs, more than any other program, seem poised to address significant lacunae in international and comparative political economy teaching. While issues of development feature prominently in today’s classrooms, much of the discourse is grounded in state-centered approaches that focus their attention on state structures, political processes, policy choices and political boundaries. Recently published reviews of the state of teaching in international and comparative political economy explain that these trends are largely a result of the dominance of political science over what should essentially be inter-disciplinary analytical questions. Not only does this imply that the debates between liberalism and realism dominate teaching at the expense of structural and critical approaches, but topics such as global inequality, poverty, migration and environmental concerns are not receiving adequate attention.

Global Studies programs can specifically compensate for these disadvantages by centering the teaching of international and comparative political economy on the issues of interdependence and globalization as processes that impact, and are conditioned by, the world society. This would address the already existing demand for giving “due attention to agents and processes less mediated through formal institutions.” Moreover, it would enable the discussion of topics that are disturbingly rare in international political economy courses such as the interaction between globalization and global health, the technological divide, the enforcement of intellectual property rights, and the impact of emigration and brain drain on underdevelopment, among others. A huge intellectual void that Global Studies promises to fill is the study of the relationship between global economic forces on the one hand and culture, religion and civilizations on the other. Adopting the focus on the world society as the unit of analysis, as opposed to the state-centered approaches, allows Global Studies to examine the role of civilizations in economic globalization, and, vice-versa, the impact of global pressures on the cultural and religious elements characterizing the world’s civilizations. In addressing these pressing issues largely ignored by international and comparative political economy, Global Studies can bring other disciplines “back to the table” by inviting practitioners, anthropologists, ecologists, sociologists, and legal scholars to join the ranks of political scientists and economists in the endeavor. It is up to Global Studies to espouse a truly transdisciplinary inquiry once promised, and only partially delivered, by international political economy scholarship.

To go beyond a program that brings multiple disciplines together, Global Studies must adequately attend to its methods curricula. Political economy programs that encourage students to take courses both in quantitative and qualitative analysis have certainly taken a step in the right direction by exposing their students to two critically important families of methods employed in social science research. However, these multi-method approaches are not free from pitfalls. Within each of the method “camps” students are still pigeonholed into using only select tools, especially with respect to quantitative methods. It would be a great disservice to students in Global Studies to require them to complete a course in econometric techniques, for example, when their research interests lie in topics that are better approached with tools of factor or principal component analyses. Students would gain more if they were offered a survey course of applied multivariate techniques, for example, structured in a way similar to the statistics courses popular in professional, public policy and business programs. A similar overview of qualitative methods for analysis and data collection would also be necessary to illustrate, for example, the profound difference between case study methods, ethnography and discourse analysis. Global Studies programs should provide the students with an opportunity to grasp the vast array of research methods and options for exploring alternative combinations of existing methods. At the same time, students should be made aware of the strengths and weaknesses of the various methods so that they can intelligently and effectively choose the most appropriate methods for their inquiries. An argument can be made that such survey courses would not adequately prepare students to employ any one specific technique, thus leaving them without the tools they may require for future careers. Unfortunately, neither is a semester long course in a specific method sufficient for students wishing to conduct a research project. For the interdisciplinary problems to which Global Studies is committed, providing students with a “taste” of methods they can access would ensure that they adopt methods that best suit their research objectives. To guarantee the discourse is driven by real world problems and research questions, and not methodological puzzles and considerations, students must be provided with an overview of the multiple research techniques available and must be encouraged to acquire more specialized training in the methods they find most appropriate. Moreover, familiarity with numerous research techniques ensures that future scholars and practitioners in Global Studies will be able to engage with each other’s work. Too often scholars from international relations and economics, working on similar problems, talk past each other because the methods employed do not translate across the disciplinary divide. Understanding the type of inquiry adopted in research across the Global Studies field will ensure that the scholars brought together to examine the challenges encountered by the world society can speak to each other without sacrificing scientific rigor.

For a scholar whose research interests simultaneously engage multiple disciplines, analytical approaches and research techniques, and who wishes to examine the dynamic processes in the world society, Global Studies programs provide an attractive option for an academic “home.” Observing Global Studies programs from the outside, it seems that behind the doors one can find stimulating research environments that promote innovative approaches that are not necessarily determined by traditional disciplinary loyalties. Not only do they encourage cooperative work among a multitude of scholars, from multiple disciplines, brought together by the nature of their research topics, but they seem to be particularly capable of overcoming present teaching deficiencies in international and comparative political economy. Successfully addressing the problems with methods training in multi- and inter-disciplinary approaches would elevate Global Studies above and beyond similar programs within existing disciplines. Naturally, the concerns over methods curricula and the training that should be provided will be in part determined through the considerations of the student body that the program wishes to recruit, and the levels of academic programs that are offered.

Notes

1. Schumpeter saw the entrepreneur as an agent of innovation, which essentially entails the “new combinations of productive means.” These combinations can take one of five different forms: 1) introduction of a new good; 2) introduction of a new method of production; 3) access to a new market previously unavailable to that particular country or industry; 4) acquiring a new source of supply; and 5) producing a change in the industry’s organization. Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1983. (orig. 1911). The Theory of Economic Development. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.

2. Burt, Ronald. 2004. Structural Holes and Good Ideas. American Journal of Sociology 110 (3): 349-99.

3. White, Gregory W. 2007. International Political Economy and the Persistent Scare Quotes around “Development”. Perspectives on Politics 5 (1): 105-113. Paul, Darel E. 2006. Teaching Political Economy in Political Science: A Review of International and Comparative Political Economy Syllabi. Perspectives on Politics 4 (4): 729-734.

4. Paul 2006, 732.

5. White 2007.

global-e volume 1 number 1 may 2007


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